Why the Affordable Care Act Authorizes Tax Credits on the Federal Exchanges by Gamage, David & Shanske, Darien
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2014
Why the Affordable Care Act Authorizes Tax
Credits on the Federal Exchanges
David Gamage
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, dgamage@indiana.edu
Darien Shanske
University of California, Davis
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Taxation-Federal Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gamage, David and Shanske, Darien, "Why the Affordable Care Act Authorizes Tax Credits on the Federal Exchanges" (2014). Articles
by Maurer Faculty. 2439.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2439
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2389446 
Why the Affordable Care Act Authorizes
Tax Credits on the Federal Exchanges
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
Despite the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 2012,
litigation over the Affordable Care Act (more commonly
known as ‘‘Obamacare’’) continues.1 In this article, we
evaluate the lawsuits and related questions stemming from
whether a state chooses to establish an American health
benefit exchange.2
The ACA directed each state to establish an exchange no
later than January 1. Those exchanges will administer the
ACA’s new premium tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies.
Employers are subject to the ACA’s employer mandate
penalties only to the extent that their employees receive
premium tax credits.3 Tax lawyers and others advising em-
ployers on their potential liability for the employer mandate
penalties must therefore understand the rules governing
whether employees can qualify for the premium tax credits
within each state.4
States may opt to not establish an exchange. If a state
chooses this option, the federal Department of Health and
Human Services ‘‘shall . . . establish and operate such
Exchange within the State. . . .’’5 A majority of states have
opted not to establish an exchange, and HHS is establishing
federal exchanges to operate in those states. The same pen-
alties apply on federal exchanges, assuming that the tax
credits are available on those exchanges.
Jonathan Adler and Michael Cannon have argued that
the ACA only authorizes premium tax credits within states
that establish an exchange.6 According to their argument,
taxpayers in states that opt to not establish those exchanges
will not be eligible for the premium tax credits and employ-
ers will not be subject to the ACA’s employer mandate
penalties.
Adler and Cannon’s argument has received a great deal of
attention over the past couple of years. In November 2011 a
group of 26 Republicans in the U.S. House of Representa-
tives wrote to then-IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman in
support of Adler and Cannon’s claim that the Treasury
Department and the IRS lack authority to grant premium
tax credits to individuals who receive health coverage
through an HHS-established exchange.7 In August 2012
the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee
held a hearing on the issue, during which Rep. Scott Des-
Jarlais, R-Tenn., called on Treasury and the IRS to withdraw
the portion of their regulation ruling that premium tax
1The ACA refers jointly to the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010 (PPACA) and the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010. For discussion of some of the ACA’s
provisions, see David Gamage, ‘‘Perverse Incentives Arising From the
Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are
Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income
Workers,’’ 65 Tax L. Rev. 669 (2012).
2PPACA section 1311(b)(1).
3Id. at section 1513.
4This penalty provision theoretically simplifies the ability of tax-
payers to challenge the tax credit provisions, as employers potentially
subject to the penalty suffer more than a ‘‘generalized grievance.’’ That
said, the application of the penalty provision has been delayed by one
year, so the status of any suit filed before then may be in question. We
do not express any views about questions of standing in this article.
5PPACA section 1321(c)(1).
6Adler and Cannon, ‘‘Taxation Without Representation: The Ille-
gal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPACA,’’ 23 Health
Matrix 119 (2013). A version of their argument was also recently made
in State Tax Notes. See Diana Furchtgott-Roth, ‘‘Courts Could End
Obamacare in Most States,’’ State Tax Notes, Dec. 16, 2013, p. 673.
7Ralph Lindeman, ‘‘Tax Credits on Federal Exchanges at Risk Due




David Gamage is an assistant pro-
fessor at the University of California
Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall)
and Darien Shanske is a professor at
the University of California Davis
School of Law (King Hall).
This column was substantially
complete in December 2013, before
the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia in Halbig v. Sebellius up-
held the use of tax credits. We agree
with the decision and supplement the
court’s analysis.
We would like to thank Leeann
Saw and Hank Nguyen for invaluable
research assistance on this article. We
would also like to thank Abbe Gluck
for very helpful comments. All errors
and opinions are our own.
ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT




ll rights reserved. Tax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2389446 
credits are available from HHS-established exchanges.8 This
regulation is currently being challenged in several lawsuits,
most notably in Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius,9 filed by
Oklahoma’s attorney general, and in Halbig v. Sebelius,10
filed by a separate group of plaintiffs.11 In this article, we
refute Adler and Cannon’s argument and the plaintiffs’
positions in Pruitt and Halbig.12
We analyze the text of the ACA as a noncontroversial
starting point. Of course, approaches to statutory interpre-
tation are legion. For the sake of simplicity, we will apply the
‘‘fair reading’’ approach recently and forcefully advanced by
Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner in their book
Reading Law.13 This method treats the text as supreme and
famously eschews legislative history, but even this approach
values indication of a text’s purpose as provided by the text
itself: ‘‘The evident purpose of what a text seeks to achieve is
an essential element of context that gives meaning to
words.’’14 In order to tease out the meaning of a text, Scalia
and Garner argue for the prudent use of canons of construc-
tion, which are just the default interpretive presumptions
that courts apply to statutes. We will follow them in their
deployment of these canons, though there are also disputes
as to what the canons are and how they operate. We are
deliberately using the minimalist set of canons embraced by
Justice Scalia, not because we necessarily agree with them,
but because we think that if these canons point strongly in
one direction, then we are on solid ground.
Adler and Cannon argue that the ‘‘plain text of the [ACA]
precludes’’ providing credits for use on federal exchanges.15
We argue below that this is incorrect. Indeed, the better
reading of the statute is that tax credits are to be available on
HHS-established exchanges. However, it is important to
note that even if we cannot resolve the disagreement about
the interpretation statute’s text, we have certainly estab-
lished that the statute is ambiguous, a fact that has impor-
tant implications. Congress has granted the Treasury De-
partment and the IRS considerable discretion in
interpreting ambiguous tax statutes in general and this tax
statute in particular.16 Consequently, despite Adler and
Cannon’s arguments to the contrary, Treasury and the IRS
clearly possessed the authority to interpret the ACA as
allowing premium tax credits on HHS-established ex-
changes.17
A. Definition of Exchange
The interpretive issue here largely revolves around the
word ‘‘exchange.’’ Scalia and Garner instruct that ‘‘defini-
tion sections and interpretation clauses are to be carefully
followed.’’18 That is where we will begin.
The ACA defines an American health benefit exchange in
two places. First, section 1311(b)(1) of the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA) says that
‘‘Each State shall, not later than January 1, 2014, establish
an American Health Benefit Exchange (referred to in this
title as an ‘Exchange’) for the State. . . .’’19 Section
1311(d)(1) defines an exchange as ‘‘a governmental agency
or nonprofit entity that is established by a State.’’20 This is
the only definition of exchange given in Title I of the
PPACA, which also includes the provisions creating the new
premium tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies.21
Second, the conforming amendments to the Public
Health Service Act contained in PPACA section 1563(b)
8William Hoffman, ‘‘House Committee Criticizes IRS on ACA
Tax Credits Rule,’’ Tax Notes, Aug. 6, 2012, p. 656.
9Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. Sebelius, No. CIV-11-30-RAW (E.D.
Okla. 2013).
10Halbig v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-00623-PLF (D.D.C. 2013).
11For discussion, see, e.g., William R. Davis and Meg Shreve,
‘‘District Court Considers Challenge to Healthcare Regs,’’ Tax Notes,
Dec. 9, 2013, p. 1029. See also Dan Diamond, ‘‘Could This Little-
Watched Court Case Sink Obamacare?’’ California Healthline, June
12, 2013, available at http://www.californiahealthline.org/road-to-
reform/2013/could-this-little-watched-court-case-sink-obamacare.
12Some of our arguments here are not new, but, to our knowledge,
they have not been collected and framed in the depth that we believe
Adler and Cannon’s position warrants. For previous responses to Adler
and Cannon, see Timothy Jost, ‘‘Tax Credits in Federally Facilitated
Exchanges Are Consistent With the Affordable Care Act’s Language
and History,’’ Health Affairs Blog, July 18, 2012, available at http://
healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/07/18/tax-credits-in-federally-facilitated-
exchanges-are-consistent-with-the-affordable-care-acts-language-and-
history/print/; Judith Solomon, ‘‘Health Reform Law Makes Clear
That Subsidies Will Be Available in States With Federally Operated
Exchanges,’’ Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, July 16, 2012;
Amy E. Sanders, ‘‘A Gap in the Affordable Care Act: Will Tax Credits
Be Available for Insurance Purchased Through Federal Exchanges?’’ 66
Vand. L. Rev. 1259 (2013). For an important discussion of the broader
legislative historical background of the ACA, see Abbe Gluck, ‘‘How
Congress Works (And the ObamaCare Subsidies Lawsuit),’’ Balkini-
zation, Dec. 12, 2013, available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/
12/how-congress-works-and-obamacare.html.
13Scalia and Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
(2012). Reading Law makes a number of strong normative arguments,
explicitly and implicitly, that we do not necessarily agree with. In fact,
in many cases we disagree. See William N. Eskridge Jr., ‘‘The New
Textualism and Normative Canons,’’ 113 Colum. L. Rev. 531 (2013).
Nevertheless, the book provides a tractable set of important canons
that its authors argue should be the basis of the careful elucidation of
legal texts, and it is in that spirit that we refer to them.
14See, e.g., Scalia and Garner, supra note 13, at 20, 30. See also
Canon 2 (‘‘Supremacy-of-Text Principle’’), supra note 13. All further
references to ‘‘Canons’’ are to the respective canons in Scalia and
Garner.
15See Adler and Cannon, supra note 6, at 142.
16See IRC section 36B(g).
17Treasury, IRS, ‘‘Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit,’’ 76 Fed.
Reg. 50,935 (Aug. 17, 2011). For disclosure, one of us (Gamage)
worked on this regulation while serving as special counsel and Senior
Stanley S. Surrey Fellow at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office
of Tax Policy, from 2010 through 2012.
18See Scalia and Garner, supra note 13, at 225 (Canon 36,
‘‘Interpretive-Direction Canon’’).
19PPACA section 1311(b)(1).
20Id. at section 1311(d)(1).
21Id. at sections 1401-1402.
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define exchange as ‘‘an American Health Benefit Exchange
established under Section 1311 of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act.’’22 This definition thus refers back
to the one cited above, meaning again that an exchange is ‘‘a
government agency or nonprofit entity that is established by
a State’’ under PPACA section 1311.
Thus, the only definitions that the ACA provides for the
term ‘‘exchange’’ specify that an exchange must be estab-
lished by a state. How then can HHS establish an exchange
on behalf of states that decide not to create an exchange on
their own? The answer comes from PPACA section 1321(c),
which provides that if a state does not establish an exchange,
then ‘‘the Secretary [of HHS] shall (directly or through an
agreement with a not-for-profit entity) establish and operate
such Exchange within the State and the Secretary shall take
such actions as are necessary to implement such other re-
quirements.’’
Beyond the passages quoted above, the ACA does not
contain any other definitions for an HHS-established ex-
change, for a federal exchange, or for anything other than an
‘‘exchange’’ — which, as defined, must be established by a
state.23 Taken literally, of course, HHS cannot possibly
establish an exchange if the definition requires that an
exchange be established by a state. But the wording of
PPACA section 1321(c) stating that the secretary of HHS
shall establish and operate ‘‘such Exchange’’ presumably
means that section 1311(d)(1)’s requirement that an ex-
change must be established by a state does not apply in the
case in which HHS establishes such exchange. Therefore,
section 1321(c) can only be interpreted as instructing HHS
to step into the shoes of the states that do not establish
exchanges in order to establish exchanges on behalf of those
states, or as otherwise designating HHS-established ex-
changes as having been established by a state. Indeed, even
Adler and Cannon do not appear to doubt that the federal
government can establish an exchange.24
Returning to our canons, this is therefore a case in which
a definition section is insufficient on its own and must be
supplemented by other canons,25 and in particular to the
presumption against ineffectiveness and absurd results.26
The surplusage canon is of no use.27 This is because the
phrase ‘‘established by a State’’ cannot be interpreted as
anything but an illustration of what was expected to be the
usual method of exchange establishment, at least when one
considers the clear direction that the federal government
establish exchanges when states choose not to do so.
It is important to note that the ACA contains many other
indications that this is not a statute in which the surplusage
canon should reign supreme. For example, ‘‘the ACA con-
tains three sections with the same number (1563) and
amends an existing provision of the Public Health Service
Act inconsistently twice within the scope of a few pages.’’28
The ACA is thus hardly a model of legislative drafting, and
it is ultimately not possible to interpret the ACA so as to give
meaning and purpose to every term and reference.
B. Tax Credits Authorized by Section 1401 of the
PPACA
With this background, we can analyze Adler and Can-
non’s argument. PPACA section 1401 authorizes the new
premium tax credits by adding section 36B to the Internal
Revenue Code. In several places, section 1401 states that to
be eligible for premium tax credits a taxpayer must enroll in
a qualified health plan offered ‘‘through an Exchange estab-
lished by the State under 1311 [of the PPACA].’’29
Adler and Cannon argue that this language means that
premium tax credits are not authorized for health plans
offered through HHS-established exchanges. They claim
that the language of IRC section 36B contains two limiting
phrases — ‘‘established by the State’’ and ‘‘under [Section]
1311.’’ Adler and Cannon contend that HHS-established
exchanges are (a) not established by a state, and (b) are
established under PPACA section 1321 rather than under
section 1311.30 Permitting tax credits on a federal exchange,
they argue, would render both of these limiting phrases
mere surplusage. Thus, in the context of section 1401, Adler
and Cannon reject the interpretation of these phrases as
illustrative and insist that they be given independent conse-
quence.31
We will begin by analyzing Adler and Cannon’s second
claim that HHS-established exchanges are not established
under PPACA section 1311. It is certainly true that without
section 1321 of the PPACA, HHS would lack the authority
to establish an exchange. However, it is also the case that
PPACA section 1321 does not, on its own, grant HHS the
authority to establish an exchange — section 1321 only
creates such authority through its linkages to section 1311.
Specifically, section 1321 says that if a state chooses not
to establish an exchange,32 or fails to meet the requirements
22Id. at section 1562(b).
23Id. at section 1311(d)(1).
24See Adler and Cannon, supra note 6, at 144.
25See Scalia and Garner, supra note 13, at 228.
26See Canons 4 (‘‘Presumption Against Ineffectiveness’’) and 37
(‘‘Absurdity Doctrine’’).
27See Canon 26 (‘‘Surplusage Canon’’).
28Jost, supra note 12.
29E.g., IRC section 36B(b)(2)(A).
30See Adler and Cannon, supra note 6, at 144-145.
31The phrase ‘‘established by the State under 1311’’ is actually itself
largely redundant. Adler and Cannon interpret the repetition as dem-
onstrating that Congress really meant this language to be limiting. Yet
one might also interpret the use of this redundancy as another indica-
tion that only mischief will ensue if every turn of phrase in the ACA
must be given independent force. Cf. Scalia and Garner, supra note 13,
at 177.
32PPACA section 1321(c)(1)(A).
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of making an exchange operational,33 then HHS shall ‘‘es-
tablish and operate such Exchange within the State. . . .’’
There is no further elaboration on what is meant by ‘‘such
Exchange.’’ Thus, the only plausible interpretation is that
HHS is empowered to establish an exchange as defined in
section 1311, which it accomplishes by acting in the place of
the state that fails to do so — in effect, by stepping into the
shoes of that state. This is the only plausible interpretation
because section 1311 is the only section of the ACA that
specifies what an exchange is.34
We thus have two possible interpretations of the
language of IRC section 36B referring to an exchange
‘‘established . . . under 1311.’’ Adler and Cannon’s
interpretation is that this language is meant to preclude
exchanges established under sections 1321 and 1311
operating together. Our interpretation is that this language
is meant to include exchanges established under sections
1321 and 1311 operating together. We will analyze the
relative merits of these two interpretations after explaining
Adler and Cannon’s other alleged ‘‘limiting phrase.’’
In addition to the phrase ‘‘established under 1311’’ in
IRC section 36B, Adler and Cannon claim the phrase
‘‘established by a State’’ clearly precludes HHS-established
exchanges. However, as we have already explained, the
ACA’s only definition of exchange specifies that all ex-
changes be established by a state.35 Again, section 1321 on
its own does not provide any authority for HHS to establish
an exchange, but only says that if a state fails to establish an
exchange under section 1311, HHS shall establish such
exchange. This language only makes sense if we interpret the
ACA as authorizing HHS to step into the shoes of states that
fail to establish exchanges in order to establish exchanges on
their behalf.
Thus, there are two possible interpretations of section
36B. Adler and Cannon’s interpretation is that the phrase
‘‘established by a State’’ precludes HHS-established ex-
changes. Our interpretation is that HHS-established ex-
changes are effectively deemed to be established by a state
through the linkages between section 1321 and section
1311 and because all exchanges in the ACA are defined as
established by a state under section 1311(d)(1) and section
1563(b).
C. The Rest of the PPACA
In weighing the merits of Adler and Cannon’s interpre-
tation against our own, we should examine the various ways
in which the ACA refers to exchanges. Again, Adler and
Cannon put great weight on the surplusage canon, ignoring
the various textual indications that this canon might not be
controlling in this situation, including with regard to the
very word ‘‘exchange.’’ Different provisions of the ACA use
a variety of terms in referring to exchanges, including
‘‘American Health Benefit Exchanges,’’36 ‘‘State Ex-
changes,’’37 ‘‘Exchanges established under this title,’’38 ‘‘Ex-
change established under section 1311,’’39 and ‘‘Exchanges
established by the State under 1311.’’40 Adler and Cannon’s
argument is based on the notion that the use of different
terms to refer to exchanges by different provisions is pur-
poseful and meaningful. Yet we can discern no pattern in the
use of these phrases.
Consider for example PPACA section 1312(f )(1), which
states that only individuals who ‘‘reside in the State that
established the Exchange’’ are qualified to purchase health
insurance from the exchange. Seen from Adler and Can-
non’s perspective, this language would preclude anyone
from purchasing health insurance from HHS-established
exchanges, because Adler and Cannon would hold that
these exchanges were not established by the state. In an
earlier version of their article, Adler and Cannon accept that
this result does in fact follow from their method, but they
argue that this result can be dismissed as absurd while still
applying their method to provisions in which the result
would not be absurd.41 In contrast, our interpretation of
section 1321, whereby HHS-established exchanges are ef-
fectively deemed to be section 1311 exchanges, avoids this
absurdity.
Consider another example.42 Section 1004 of the Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 refers to
exchanges established by section 1311 (that is, by a state)
and section 1321 (that is, by HHS). This would seem to
indicate, and Adler and Cannon insist that it does indicate,
that Congress knew how to specifically refer to both kinds of
33Id. at section 1321(c)(1)(B).
34There are other provisions that, like section 1321, specify types of
exchanges or features related to exchanges, but that, like section 1321,
operate through linkages to section 1311 and would not have meaning
in its absence.
35PPACA section 1311.
36Id. at section 1311(a).
37Id. at sections 2718(d) and 2101(e).
38Id. at sections 1332(b)(1)(A) and 1303(a)(3)(A).
39E.g., id. at sections 6065(b)(1)(B) and 1515(a)(3)(A).
40E.g., id. at sections 2001(b)(2) and 2101(b)(3)(B).
41Adler and Cannon, ‘‘Taxation Without Representation, The
Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under PPACA,’’ Working
Paper 2012-27 (July 2012), at 53-54.
42There are many other examples we could also cite. For instance,
section 1414(a)(2) authorizes ‘‘The Secretary of Health and Human
Services, and the Exchanges established under section 1311 of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, . . . to collect and use the
names and social security account numbers of individuals as required
to administer the provisions of, and the amendments made by, the such
Act.’’ Does the inclusion of only section 1311 exchanges preclude the
use of Social Security numbers by federal exchanges? Under Adler and
Cannon’s interpretation, the answer would be yes, unless again the
result is dismissed as absurd. See also Defendants’ Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 13-18, Halbig v.
Sebelius, No. 1:13-cv-00623-PLF (D.D.C. 2013).
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exchanges.43 However, section 1004 imposes various report-
ing requirements on exchanges in connection with tax cred-
its, including the ‘‘aggregate amount of any advance pay-
ment of such credit. . . .’’ This information is to be provided
to HHS and to the taxpayer. Why would the statute go out
of its way to require reporting about a credit that, on Adler
and Cannon’s reading, cannot be granted on federal ex-
changes? Adler and Cannon assert it was just easier to have
one reporting requirement, and telling taxpayers what they
do not have is a useful way of encouraging states to establish
exchanges. We think this explanation is not a fair reading of
the statute. Any provision that puts into place a large report-
ing infrastructure should be presumed to have meant to
report something significant.44
Here is another similar riddle involving reporting:
PPACA section 6005 requires some disclosures of informa-
tion for an organization that provides ‘‘pharmacy benefit
management services’’ to an ‘‘exchange established by a State
under section 1311’’ (or another entity not relevant here).
Does this limiting language mean that such an organization
need not provide these disclosures, such as ‘‘the percentage
of prescriptions for which a generic drug was available and
dispensed,’’ if it contracts with a federal exchange? Why
would this information be less important in connection
with federal exchanges?
There are other related internal indicators that tax credits
for individuals are available on federal exchanges. A particu-
larly important example is the way in which the Act estab-
lishes Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP)
exchanges. These exchanges are supposed to be one-stop
shops for the employees of small businesses to purchase
insurance, just as the exchanges we have been discussing to
this point are meant to be one-stop shops for all other
individuals to purchase insurance. And, as in the individual
marketplace, individuals are to be encouraged to purchase
insurance through these exchanges by means of tax credits.
SHOP exchanges are established by the same provision as
the individual exchanges.45 Indeed, the states are permitted
to merge their individual exchanges with their SHOP ex-
changes.46 PPACA section 1421 authorizes tax credits to be
used on SHOP exchanges, just as section 1401 establishes
individual tax credits. The credit provisions have interlock-
ing definitions and similar structures, including progressive
phaseouts.47 Treasury is given the authority to interpret both
provisions.48 The structure of the PPACA therefore indi-
cates that the two kinds of exchanges are to be interpreted
symmetrically.
However, the authorization for the use of tax credits on a
SHOP exchange uses the phrase ‘‘an Exchange’’ in multiple
places — without further qualification. Sticking to the
anti-surplusage canon here would presumably mean that
the employees of small businesses in states with a federal
exchange can receive credits, while the unemployed, the
self-employed, or those employed by large employers can-
not. Adler and Cannon seemingly embrace this result. In-
deed, they view this result as evidence that Congress clearly
knew how to use the unrestricted word ‘‘exchange’’ when it
wished to do so. But again, this analysis seems to get matters
backward. What discernable purpose could this distinction
have?49 Is there any other indication in the text that the
PPACA wanted there to be this kind of distinction? Con-
gress specifically allowed both kinds of exchanges to be
merged. Over-reliance on this one canon creates absurd
disjunctions that violate the canons concerning making the
statute more effective (Canon 4) and harmonious (Canon
27).
D. Conclusion
Adler and Cannon would have a strong argument if the
ACA had been written so that section 1321 contained its
own definition of an exchange, or if section 1321 included
language indicating that HHS-established exchanges were
meant to be different from exchanges as defined in section
1311. But this is not how the statute was written. Instead,
section 1321 says only that HHS shall establish ‘‘such
Exchange[s].’’ Adler and Cannon’s interpretation requires
that such exchanges be distinct in nature from the definition
of exchange provided in section 1311, despite the fact that
section 1563 specifies that the definition of exchange is the
definition from section 1311, and despite the fact that the
ACA provides no other definition for the term ‘‘ex-
change.’’50
Adler and Cannon would also have a strong argument if
the ACA consistently used ‘‘established by a State’’ or ‘‘under
Section 1311’’ as words of limitation. As to at least one key
question — whether the federal government can establish
an exchange at all — Adler and Cannon concede that these
phrases cannot be taken as absolutely limiting and must
therefore be illustrative. On another important question —
43Adler and Cannon, supra note 6, at 161-162.
44See Canon 4 (‘‘Presumption Against Ineffectiveness’’).
45PPACA section (1)(B).
46Id. at section 1311(b)(2).
47See, e.g., IRC section 45R(b)(1) (‘‘qualified health plan’’ central to
measuring size of SHOP credit); section 36B(b)(2)(A) (also using
‘‘qualified health plan’’ for measurement of individual credit); section
36B(c)(3)(A) (defining ‘‘qualified health plan’’ by reference to PPACA
section 1301(a)); see also section 45R(c) (average wages one way that
SHOP credits phase out); and section 36B(b)(3)(A) (value of indi-
vidual credit phases out with household income).
48IRC section 36B(g); section 45R(i).
49Adler and Cannon offer an explanation, based primarily on
legislative history, for why the PPACA might have deliberately made
federal exchanges less attractive: a desire to convince the states to start
their own exchanges. But this explanation fails to address why the
PPACA would want to distinguish the two types of exchanges (indi-
vidual and SHOP) in this way. We also do not agree that the legislative
history indicates that tax credits were not to be made available on
federal exchanges. See Gluck, supra note 12.
50PPACA section 1562(b).
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whether individuals could ever purchase insurance from a
federal exchange — we assume that Adler and Cannon
would concede that over-reliance on the anti-surplusage
canon is likewise inappropriate.
As for other seeming anomalies caused by insistence on
this one canon, our sense is that Adler and Cannon accept
the results. Thus, on their reading of the ACA, only small
business employees are eligible for credits on federal ex-
changes, the federal exchanges must report on the credits
they have not provided, and some important information
about prescription drug costs need not be reported to federal
exchanges. We do not know why these results, either indi-
vidually or in the aggregate, do not qualify as absurd. Or, put
another way, we do not know what textual warrant permits
Adler and Cannon to read the ‘‘established by a State’’ clause
sometimes as a limitation and sometimes as an illustration.
On balance, we think the much better interpretation of
the text of the ACA is that HHS-established exchanges
qualify under the general definition of an exchange provided
in section 1311 and are therefore effectively deemed to be
established by the state on behalf of which HHS is acting.
This interpretation maximizes the harmonious functioning
of the whole statute, is grounded on the only definition of
the word ‘‘exchange’’ present in the ACA, and does not
require ad hoc picking and choosing regarding the impor-
tance of the phrase ‘‘established by a State.’’ In so arguing, we
are mindful of the importance of the non-surplusage canon,
but also of the fact that, as Scalia and Garner warn, no canon
is absolute.51 In this case, other weighty canons yield better
results. In particular, we have appealed to the presumption
against ineffectiveness,52 the whole text canon,53 the harmo-
nious reading canon,54 and the absurdity doctrine canon.55
We do not mean to suggest that Adler and Cannon’s
interpretation is completely implausible, just that there is a
better interpretation. At the very least, we believe we have
established that the statute is ambiguous on this issue and
that Treasury and the IRS have arrived at a reasonable
interpretation worthy of deference.56 ✰
51See Canon 3 (‘‘Principle of Interrelating Canons’’).
52See Canon 4 (‘‘Presumption Against Ineffectiveness’’).
53Canon 24 (‘‘Whole-Text Canon’’).
54Canon 27 (‘‘Harmonious-Reading Canon’’).
55Canon 37 (‘‘Absurdity Doctrine’’).
56See Gluck, supra note 12.
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